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I. INTRODUCTION
"How different is the requirement that women wear veils from
laws dictating that Jews wear yellow stars? In broad societal terms,
both laws create badges of inferiority. Yet, we immediately recog-
nize the latter to be persecution, not merely because of the conse-
quences attached, but because it is fundamentally cruel. Why do we
not respond to the former the same way?"'
The typical image of a human rights victim is a male, tortured
for his religious or political beliefs or his race or nationality. 2 The
torture that this man faces - beating, burning, rape and mental
abuse, are all perceived as forms of persecution. 3 Worldwide, gov-
ernments have recognized that no one should be persecuted for
these reasons and have extended asylum protection to these vic-
tims. 4 Yet, throughout the world when a woman is beaten, burnt,
1. Walter C. Long, Escape from Wonderland: Implementing Canada's Rational Proce-
dures to Evaluate Women's Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 179, 217
(1994).
2. Todd Stewart Schenk, A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women in Asylum
Law: Adding a "Gender" Category to the International Definition of "Refugee, " 2 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 301 (1994).
3. In re D-V-, Interim Dec. 3252 (B.I.A. 1993). See also Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813
F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987). Beatings and rape are acknowledged as forms of perse-
cution and acts of violence.
4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Appeal - Facts and
Figures, 12 UNHCR, Geneva (2001). Governments work together with UNHCR to grant
asylum to refugees by permitting them to remain in their national country. Countries
do so by providing naturalization, land and permitting their legal employment or pro-
viding financial aid.
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mentally abused or genitally mutilated, by her government or by
another citizen, it is called a private matter or a cultural anomaly. 5
Despite the fact that over half of the 19 million refuges in the world
are women, almost all nations extend asylum protection in a man-
ner that discriminates against women.6
This case comment examines the recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Yadegar-Sargis v.
INS. 7 This comment argues that gender specific abuses against
women should clearly be considered violations of fundamental
human rights warranting a grant of asylum protection. 8
Part II provides a background in U.S. and international asylum
laws. This section reviews the current status of refugee law, includ-
ing relevant definitions and criteria. Part III provides a factual and
procedural history of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decision in Yadegar-Sargis. Part IV analyzes the
Court's decision in Yadegar-Sargis. In addition, this section explores
the inadequate protection of current U.S. asylum law for those
women who face gender specific persecutions. Furthermore, this
section analyzes current trends in both U.S. and international asy-
lum law. Part V calls for an amendment to U.S. asylum law to in-
clude a gender-category. This section explores the current
5. Gayle Binion, Human Rights, A Feminist Perspective, 519, 521 HUMAN RIGHTS
QUA rERLY 17:3 (1995). See also Stephanie Kaye Pell, Adjudication of Gender Persecution
Cases Under the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to Fear an Onslaught of
Asylum Claims, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 655, 657 (1995). The public/private
dichotomy of gender oppression results in the general denial of asylum status to perse-
cuted women. However, it is well recognized that the principle of noninterference with
family autonomy is nowhere a fully accepted concept. Rather persecutions that occur
within the home are no different from other forms of persecution just because a family
member carries them out.
6. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Women, Children, and Older
Refugees: The Sex and Age Distribution of Refugee Populations with a Special Emphasis of
UNHCR Policy Priorities, UNHCR, Geneva (2001). As ofJuly 2002, there were more than
19 million refugees worldwide. It has been estimated that 51 percent of these refugees
are women. Almost every nation is plagued with thousands of refugees who are women.
Despite the already high number of refugees who are women, the numbers continue to
grow.
7. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2002).
8. James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as
Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REv. 989,
1045 (1997). There is evidence of progress by international law and some countries in
recognizing the right to asylum based on gender specific abuses.
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techniques and methods being used to evaluate gender specific
claims. In addition, this section explores international solutions to
the problems of gender-specific abuse. This comment concludes in
Part VI that U.S. asylum law fails to protect women who are victims
of gender-specific abuses and thus the law should be amended. In
addition, this section concludes that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit decision in Yadegar-Sargis should be
overruled.
II. HISTORY OF ASYLUM LAWS
A. Establishing Asylum in the United States
1. United Nations Charter (1945)
Modern international concepts of human rights were formu-
lated in the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter) in 1945. 9 The
purpose of the U.N. Charter is to create international cooperation
among nations and to identify, clarify and secure the common in-
terests10 of its citizens with "respect for human rights and for funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.""
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
The United States, like most nations, derives its modern asylum
law from international principals. 12 Also, in order to ensure the
9. See U.N. Charter, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
opened for signature October 24, 1945, An American History of Human Rights Movements,
National Center for Human Rights Education. The United Nations Charter was the first
document in post-World War II era that asserted the importance of international
human rights, on a truly international level. The words "human rights" date back to as
early as 1858 when Frederick Douglass protested the lynching of a Black man as a
human fights violation. However, human rights movements can be dated back to the
late 1400's during the colonization of North America that led to a Native American
Rights Movement against dispossession and genocide. Furthermore, the word "human-
ity" dates back to many early religions such as Islam and Christianity. For example, the
Koran explicitly lays out the foremost basic rights of life such as the fight to life, the
fight to safety, the respect for the chastity of women, the fight to justice, and the equal-
ity of human beings.
10. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw: A-
PoLcIv ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE. (2d ed., Yale University Press, 2001).
11. U.N. Charter, supra note 9, at art. 4, para. 3.
12. Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Denied for Abused Girl; Ruling of Appeals Panel is As-
sailed, WASHINGTON POST, July 4, 1999, at A03. See also Deborah Anker et al., Women
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common interests of human rights, the United States has adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). t 3 The UDHR
declares that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person. 14 Slavery and servitude are also prohibited 15 and "no one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."16 The Declaration recognizes that "eve-
ryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth [sic] with-
out distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status. 17
3. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951)
Additionally, the United States has adopted the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNCR) 18
and the ensuing 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(UNPR).19 The Convention and the Protocol outline the generally
accepted principles of asylum law, which were later codified in the
Whose Governments are Unable or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Vio-
lence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709
(1997). United States asylum law is derived mainly from international documents such
as the United Nations Charter, The United Nations 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was unanimously adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly.
14. Id. at art. 3.
15. Id. at art. 4.
16. Id. at art. 5.
17. Id. at art. 2.
18. CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, JULY 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
19. PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, JAN. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Both the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees outline the generally accepted formulations
of asylum law. None of these documents have expressly defined the terms "persecution"
or "well-founded fear of persecution" which are fundamental to the definition of a refu-
gee, but judicial and statutory interpretations of these concepts exist within countries
that have adopted the UNPR and UNCR definitions.
2004]
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 195220 and the Refugee Act of
1980.21
B. Criteria
Both the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 adopted the five criteria for which a refugee may
apply for asylum enumerated in the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol. The five criteria are (1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality,
(4) political opinion, or (5) membership in a particular social
group.22
1. Definition of a Refugee
The acts adopt the international definition of a refugee as "any
person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country
in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution" on account of the one of the five
enumerated categories of a refugee. 23
a. Persecution
An asylum officer must first assess whether the fear an appli-
cant faces amounts to persecution. 24 In order to constitute persecu-
tion, an alien must have faced persecution or have a fear of being
persecuted by his or her national government or an agent of that
national government.25 Persecution may also be inflicted by a
group or an individual citizen in which the national government
20. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY Acr OF 1952, 66 STAT. 163 (1952) (CODIFIED AS
AMENDED IN SCATTERED SECTIONS OF 8 U.S.C.) THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
OF 1952 WAS THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL ATrEMPT TO COORDINATE ALL OF THE EXISTING IMMI-
GRATION LAWS INTO ONE SINGLE STATUTE.
21. REFUGEE ACT OF 1980, PUB. L. No. 96-212, 94 STAT. 102 (1980).
22. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 18.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988).
24. See id. at § 1225 (b) (1) (B). The applicant must understand that there is a "sig-
nificant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the
alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer,
that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum."
25. Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (lst Cir. 1971).
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refuses or is unwilling to control.26 Persecution "encompasses more
than threats to life or freedom."2 7 Rather, the persecution must
"rise above the level of mere harassment to constitute
persecution."28
Furthermore, asylum applicants must establish that they have
endured past persecution. 29 Additionally, asylum applicants may
come forward with evidence that they will endure persecution if re-
turned to their country of origin.30
b. Well Founded Fear
The Supreme Court has defined "well-founded fear" as the ex-
istence of a well-founded fear of persecution with a "clear
probability" that an asylum applicant may suffer from a likelihood
of persecution in her homeland.3 1
The definition of a "well founded fear of persecution" contains
both a subjective and objective component. 32 The fear must be
both genuine [subjective] and have "some basis in the reality of the
circumstances and is not mere irrational apprehension" [objec-
tive] .33 To satisfy both the subjective and objective components, an
asylum applicant must show that his or her fear is genuine and that
a reasonable person in the same circumstances would fear persecu-
tion if returned to the applicant's native country.3 4 The asylum ap-
plicant bears the burden of proof for both components. 35 The
applicant must present detailed facts that would show good reason
26. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
27. Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 222 F.3d 417, 424 (7th Cir. 2000).
28. Sofinet v. INS, 196 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 1999).
29. Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1997).
30. Id. at 379.
31. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 418 (1984).
32. Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 639 (8th Cir. 1994).
33. Guevara-Flores, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (1986).
34. Carvajal-Munoz v. I.N.S., 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Jill C.
Stroguiludis, The Refugee Act of 1980: An Empty Promise to Exploited Children, 29 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 995, 1012 (1996).
35. Stroguiludis, supra note 34, at 1012. Federal courts insist that the applicant
present facts to establish that he or she has been a victim of persecution. Facts support-
ing either a past persecution or a risk of future persecution would satisfy the
requirements.
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of a "well founded fear of persecution," 36 after which the Attorney
General has the discretion to grant asylum.3 7
C. The Five Enumerated Categories of Asylum
1. Race
There is no universally accepted definition of the term "race,"
but for the purposes of a refugee, race has been defined to include
all kinds of ethnic groups that are otherwise referred to as "races."38
Additionally, the implication of race, for the purposes of defining a
refugee, will often be identified with a membership of a particular
social group of common descent that forms a minority within the
larger population. 39
2. Religion
Similarly, religion lacks a clear definition in international law.
However, most organizations interpret "religion" to have a broad
meaning and to include theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. 40
Both the UDHR and the Human Rights Convention claim a
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.41 It is well
known that persons may face harm for their particular religious be-
liefs or practices. 42 Such harms or persecutions include a person's
refusal to hold particular religious beliefs or a refusal to practice a
36. Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 567-68. See also 8 C.F.R § 208.5; Sivaainkaran v.
INS, 972 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1992).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
38. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4
(1979). The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
views discrimination by reasons of race as one of the most striking violations of human
rights. See also European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the Position on the Inter-
pretation of Article I of the Refugee Convention, September 2000.
39. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 38, at 68.
40. European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the Position on the Interpreta-
tion of Article I of the Refugee Convention, September 2000, supra note 38, at 53.
41. See supra note 13, at art. 4.
42. Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 25, HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7,
2002).
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prescribed religion. 43 Persecution on religious grounds may also oc-
cur where a person does not wish to profess any religion or does
not wish to comply with all or part of the rites and customs relating
to a particular religion. 44
3. Nationality
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that, "no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality."45 Nationality
has both an important bearing upon a person's legal status and his
ability to exercise the freedom of fundamental human and political
rights. 46 The right to a nationality must be considered an inherent
human right.47
In relation to the refugee problem, nationality is of great con-
sequence in situations where there is an arbitrary loss of national-
ity.48 Like most international jurisprudence, there is no clear rule
under what conditions expatriation, or loss of nationality, is consid-
ered arbitrary.49 However, it is recognized that discriminatory indi-
vidual expatriation constitutes a violation of public international
law. 50
Overall, nationality should be understood in its broadest sense
to include membership of an ethnic or linguistic group. 51 The
term "nationality" should not be confined exclusively to the idea of
citizenship. 52 Rather, it should include membership of a group de-
termined by its cultural or linguistic identity, traditions or customs,
common roots or its relationship with the population of another
state. 53 Stateless persons within a state may also be considered a
43. See supra note 13.
44. HANDBOOK ON THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STUATS OF REFU-
GEES, supra note 38, at 71.
45. See supra note 13, at art. 15 (2).
46. Dr. Kay Hailbronner, Nationality, Conference on International Legal Norms
and Migration (2002).
47. CHEN, supra note 10.
48. Id.
49. HAILBRONNER, supra note 46.
50. Id.
51. Rodger Haines, Gender-Related Persecution, New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals
Authority (August 10, 2001).
52. See supra note 38, at 74.
53. Id.
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minority group. 54 Additionally, the refugee status based upon na-
tionality may overlap with the other enumerated categories, such as
"race," "religion" and "political opinion. '55
4. Political Opinion
Persecution based on political opinion has been described as a
government's infliction of harm or suffering to trump a citizen's
political opinion. 56 To gain asylum based on one's political opin-
ion, applicants must be able to show a connection between the per-
secution they suffer and their political opinion. 57 Political opinion
should be interpreted in the broadest sense and is generally
thought of as persecution of persons on the ground that they hold
contrary opinions to that of their government or ruling party. 58
5. Membership in a Particular Social Group
To qualify for asylum based on a particular social group, an
alien must identify with the particular social group, establish that
she is a member of that group, and establish that her well-founded
fear of persecution is based on her membership in that group. 59
"Membership in a particular social group" is to be interpreted
broadly.60 There is no requirement that all members of a group
know each other or associate with one another.61 Additionally,
54. Id.
55. HAINES, supra note 51.
56. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985).
57. See supra note 38. An applicant will have to show more than mere disagree-
ment with the policies of the authorities within the country of origin. The applicant will
also have to show that the authorities or agents of the country have knowledge of the
applicant's political opinions and do not tolerate them.
58. Matter of Acosta, supra note 56, at 212.
59. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (a) (42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2003).
Membership of a particular social group should not be a "catch all" guaranteeing pro-
tection to all those who would otherwise not be protected by asylum law.
60. In re R-A-, 2001 BIA LEXIS 1, 61 (2001); see also Daniel Compton, Asylum for
Persecuted Social Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar - Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d
1571 (9th Cir. 1986), 62 WASH. L. REv. 913, 925, see also Requena-Cruz, (Apr. 8, 1986)
No. T83-10559 at 5 (I.A.B). The definition of social group should be given broad and
liberal interpretation in order to protect groups or individuals who would not necessa-
rily have protection under one of the four other categories of a refugee.
61. San Remo Expert Roundtable, Consultations on International Protection,
UNHCR/IOM/08/2002 (2002).
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there is no requirement that the particular group be cohesive. 62
However, a particular social group will share at least one common
characteristic that is innate and unchangeable 63 because it is funda-
mental to their individual identities or consciences. 64 A person ap-
plying for asylum on the basis of membership in a particular social
group need not establish that every member within that group suf-
fers from a well-founded fear of persecution. 65
III. BACKGROUND OF YADEGAR-SARGIS
A. Factual Background
Nazani Yadegar-Sargis, a seventy-one year old citizen of Iran,
sought asylum in the United States. 66 As a woman and an Armenian
Christian, she began to experience difficulties in Iran when the
Ayatollah Khomeini67 came to power in 1979.68 With the establish-
ment of the Khomeini regime came a government-sanctioned hier-
archy of punishment for failing to adhere to the Islamic dress
code.69
Ms. Sargis was forced to wear the Islamic dress, the hijab (head
veil) .70 After police approached her twice for not following the Is-
lamic dress code, Ms. Sargis complied out of fear for her safety. 71
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1988).
65. Id.
66. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2002).
67. Ali Banuazizi, Islamic State and Civil Society in Iran, 17th Annual Joseph (Buddy)
Strelitz Lecture (April 18, 1999). In 1979 in Iran the Ayatollah Khomeini established a
theocratic republic with fundamentalist Islamic law and broad supervisory powers.
68. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 599.
69. Id.; see also KEITH HODKINSON, MUSLIM FAMILY LAw: A SOURCEBOOK (London,
Canberra: Croom Helm 1984). The Shar'ia, a religious code of conduct, governs all
aspects of a Muslim's life. The Shar'ia is based primarily upon the Qur'an as well as
traditions of the prophet. To some extent, the resurgence of radical Islamic fundamen-
talism in many countries during recent decades has been driven by an insistence upon
the adoption of the Shar'ia as the governing law of the land. The new law under the
Ayatollah Khomeini repealed most laws that had aided in the advancement of women
in the former regime. Due to the vagueness of both the Qur'an and the Iranian Consti-
tution there are many misinterpretations and misunderstandings of the law. Because of
such misinterpretations, the rights of all people, especially that of women, have been
infringed upon.
70. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 599.
71. Id. at 600.
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She was aware of the fact that severe punishment ensued for offend-
ers of the law, such as being spray painted or sprayed with acid.72
Additionally, women who went out without covering their faces and
who wore lipstick would have their lips rubbed with pieces of
glass. 73 Furthermore, government agents, who would be stationed
outside the churches, hassled young girls and women as they
entered. 74
After overstaying her visitor's visa to the United States, the INS
instituted deportation proceedings against Ms. Sargis. 75 Ms. Sargis
claimed asylum on the basis of having a well-founded fear of perse-
cution based on her membership in the group of Christian women
who oppose wearing the Islamic garb. 76 She asserted that if she
were to return to Iran she would suffer persecution on the basis of
that membership. 77
B. Procedural Background
Ms. Sargis faced deportation proceedings before an Immigra-
tion judge (J) onJuly 2, 1993.78 She asserted that if she returned to
Iran, she would suffer persecution on the basis of her membership
in a particular social group, that being Christian women who op-
pose wearing the Islamic garb. 79 The IJ denied asylum under the
Immigration and Nationality Act and refused to withhold
deportation.80
The IJ characterized Ms. Sargis' claims as based on her religion
and gender.81 The IJ understood her contention to be a gender-
based claim, namely that she felt compelled to wear an Islamic
dress, the hijab. 82 Ms. Sargis claimed that she feared that if she did
not wear the hijab she would suffer the consequences. 83
72. Id. at 599.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 598.
76. Id. at 603.
77. Id. at 602.
78. Id. at 600.
79. Id. at 602.
80. Id. at 598.
81. Id. at 600.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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The IJ concluded that because Ms. Sargis did in fact wear the
dress and was never harmed, arrested or imprisoned, her exper-
iences did not rise to the level of persecution. 84 Thus the IJ con-
cluded that Ms. Sargis should not be granted asylum status.85
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immi-
gration Judge's decision in its entirety.86 The BIA first assessed Ms.
Sargis' claims of past persecution. 87 The BIA characterized persecu-
tion as an "extreme concept" and stated that Ms. Sargis' exper-
iences did not rise to this level.88 The BIA held that although Ms.
Sargis was forced to wear the Muslim garb for fear of being attacked
and was "deplorable," the act only constituted harassment, and not
persecution. 89
Additionally, the BIA found that Ms. Sargis' claim did not
amount to a well-founded fear of persecution.90 The BIA recog-
nized that women, who share in the plight of fearing the threat of
persecution for failing to conform to the dress code imposed by
Iranian Islamic law, may qualify as a particular social group for the
purposes of asylum law.9 1 The BIA stated that it "would find the
members of the group [those who oppose wearing the Islamic
dress] should not be required to change their opposition because it
is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences." 92 The
BIA recognized that Ms. Sargis' opposition to Iranian Islamic law is
fundamental to her individual identity or conscience.93
Nevertheless, the BLA rejected Ms. Sargis' argument that she
would suffer persecution because of her membership in this
group.9 4 The Court noted that, if returned to Iran, Ms. Sargis would
continue to conform to the dress code and practice her Christian
religion. 95
84. Id.
85. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 600.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 600.
91. Id. at 601.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 601.
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After being denied asylum status by the BIA, Ms. Sargis sought
further review in the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit.96 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the
IJ and BIA. 97 The Court denied Ms. Sargis asylum on the basis that
she had failed to establish that she had suffered past persecution, as
required to establish fear of future persecution. 98 Additionally, the
Court held that Ms. Sargis did not have a well-founded fear of per-
secution based on her membership in a particular social group, i.e.
Christian women of Iran opposed to wearing the Islamic garb. 99
The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Sargis would not fall within
the narrower category of women who refuse to wear the Islamic
garb because she has complied with the requirements of Iranian
Islamic law and has indicated that she will continue to comply if
returned to Iran. 100
The Court did not find that complying with the Islamic dress
requirements would constitute persecution. 10 1 The Court held that
the dress requirements are not "abhorrent to [Ms. Sargis'] deepest
beliefs." 10 2 The Court determined that because Ms. Sargis' compli-
ance with the dress code did not implicate a fundamental belief
and because she had complied with the dress code in the past, com-
pliance did not rise to the level of a well-founded fear of
persecution.10 3
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH YADEGAR-SARGIS AND
CURRENT ASYLUM LAW
A. Current Standards in the Law and its Problems
The holding in Yadegar-Sargis best exemplifies the U.S. Courts'
inability to provide adequate protection for women who face perse-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 606.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id. at 604.
100. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 604, n.6.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 605. See also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).
103. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d at 605, supra note 66, see also Fisher v. INS, 79 F. 3d 955
(9th Cir. 1996).
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cutions based on their gender. 0 4 The Court held that Ms. Sargis
did not suffer from a well-founded fear of persecution based upon
any one of the five enumerated conditions that constitute asylum in
the United States.10 5 In effect, because the Court used current stan-
dards in asylum law, it was not able to grant the proper asylum sta-
tus which Ms. Sargis was entitled to receive. 106
Because current asylum law lacks a clear definition of well-
founded fear of persecution, women who seek refugee status on the
basis of gender-related persecutions receive inadequate protec-
tion. 10 7 Additionally, because asylum may only be sought under the
five enumerated categories of a refugee, a woman seeking refuge
on the basis of gender-specific crimes has no proper outlet to seek
such sanctity.108 There are several reasons why women continue to
receive inadequate protection.
First, women seeking asylum in the United States based upon
gender-related persecutions are forced to argue persecution based
on their membership in a particular social group or political opin-
ion, for lack of a gender option.10 9 In the absence of a separate and
distinct gender category, the courts are encouraged to accommo-
104. Lindsay M. Gray, Changing Asylum Law for Afghan Women Under the Taliban: Des-
perate Times, Moderate Measures, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 557, 572, 558 (2001).
105. Yadegar-Sargis, 297 F.3d 596 at 604.
106. Refugee Women's Resource Project Asylum Aid, WOMEN'S ASYLUM NEWS, Sept. 2001.
The Yadegar-Sargis court made no express reference to guidelines on gender.
107. In re D-K-, (Immigr. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998) (denying asylum to a battered woman
because she "has simply not shown that the violence against her is related to anything
more than evil in the heart of her husband"), In re A-, (Immigr. Ct. Jan. 8, 1998) (case
where petitioner fears violent attacks from male members of her family for refusing to
marry found to be a "mere family dispute") In re G-R- (Immigr. Ct. Oct. 20, 1997)
(finding a lack of nexus between domestic violence and an enumerated ground for
refugee status.)
108. Bernstein Murray, Sex for Food in a Refugee Economy: Human Rights Implications
and Accountability, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 985, 1016 (2000).
109. Lydia Brashear Tiede, Battered Immigrant Women and Immigration Remedies: Are
the Standards Too High?, 28 HUM. RTs. 21, 21 (2001). Generally gender-based claims
must be made upon membership in a particular social group. See also Emma
Ganderton, A Well-Founded Fear of Exclusion: Gender-Related Persecution as a Ground for Ref-
ugee Status, at http://www.law.ecel.uwa.edu.au/elawjournal/Volume%202/Articles%20
Vol_2/wellfoun.pdf (last visited April 14, 2003). Since sex or gender is not a Conven-
tion ground, women fearing gender-related persecution have to fit their claims into one
of the existing grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion. Membership of a particular social group has been the most
commonly used category in this respect.
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date women's claims of persecution with the theoretically and em-
pirically vexing category of membership in a particular social
group.' 10 This raises difficulties for women claiming refugee status
since their grouping is defined by their experience of persecu-
tion.' 1 The shared experience of women who have suffered vio-
lence is not enough to make them a "social group," unless the fact
of their violation will, in the future, make them a target of
persecution." 12
This strategy has created an often mechanistic and reductive
classification problem by creating artificial sub-categories that are
arbitrarily either denied or granted asylum. 1 3 For example, Ameri-
can courts have identified "women who are members of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been
subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe,
and who oppose the practice"' 14 as a relevant social group in a suc-
cessful asylum claim. Yet, "Guatemalan women who have been in-
volved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
that women are to live under male domination,"' 1 5 were classified
as a relevant social group in a claim that was denied.
Second, courts have been hesitant to accept female asylum ap-
plicants as a member of one of the five enumerated classes. 16 For
example, the Second Circuit upheld the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals denial of political asylum for an El Salvadoran woman who
sought refuge as a member of a particular social group. 117 The
woman sought asylum as a member of a particular group of women
whom El Salvadoran guerilla forces had previously battered and
raped.118 The Court denied the applicant political asylum finding
110. Australian Law Reform Commission, Violence and Women's Refugee Status in
EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: JUSTICE FOR WOMEN (1994).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996).
115. In re R-A-, 2001 BIA LEXIS 1.
116. Nancy Ann Root and Sharyn A. Tejani, Undocumented: The Roles of Women in
Immigration Law, 83 GEO. L. J. 605, 616-617 (1994). Asylum claims of women often in-
volve rape and domestic violence, howeverjudges tend to view such matters as personal
disputes and are hesitant to view women as a social group for fear of encouraging a new
waive of immigrants to the United States.
117. Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
118. Id at 663.
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that the harm she experienced was not the result of her member-
ship in a particular social group or any other basis in the refugee
definition. 119 In denying her asylum, the court noted that she
failed to produce evidence that women who have previously been
abused by the guerrillas possess common characteristics, other than
gender, such that would-be prosecutors could identify them as
members of the purported group. 20 By stating so, the court overtly
omitted that the members of a "purported group" may be of a spe-
cific gender. However, because gender is not yet a category in U.S.
asylum law, this woman was denied refugee status. Had gender
been a legitimate category of persecution, there is no doubt she
would have been granted asylum. 121
Third, the claims of women asylum seekers often differ from
those of men seeking asylum. 122 The INS Gender Guidelines recog-
nize that women often experience types of persecution different
from those faced by men, persecution that is "particular to their
gender."123
The claims of women are different from those of men for sev-
eral reasons. First, women suffer harms which are either unique to
their gender, or are more commonly inflicted upon women than
men. 124 These are harms that, for biological reasons, can only be
inflicted on women. 125 Second, women suffer social harms exclu-
119. Id. at 664.
120. Id.
121. Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law; Recognizing Persecution Based on Gen-
der Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137, 147 (1995).
122. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Position on Asylum Seeking and Refu-
gee Women (Dec. 1997). Women are frequently persecuted for reasons similar to their
male counterpart, however the persecution women face differs in terms of form and
motivation. Women are targeted for various reasons. Some women suffer persecution
because they are leaders within their community who persist in demanding that their
rights be respected. Others suffer because they are vulnerable young women who can
easily be abused. See also, Ganderton, supra note 109.
123. Anker et al., supra note 12, at 713. The INS Guidelines cite domestic violence
as one type of abuse that is gender-specific. Id. at 713.
124. Gregory A. Kelson, Gender Based Persecution and Political Asylum: The Interna-
tional Debate for Equality Begins, 6 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 181, 185-186 (1997) (citing Office
of the United States High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 51 (1979)).
125. Kelson, at 184, 189. Female genital mutilation and forcible abortion are forms
of persecution, which are exclusive to women. Rape and domestic violence are harms,
which are more commonly inflicted on women. Until 1980, a husband was able to kill
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sively because they are women. 126 The policies of the former
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and moral codes in Iran are exam-
ples of policies that are directed exclusively towards women.
127
Under the Taliban, Afghan women and girls were subjected to
rape, forced marriage and forced prostitution 128 and were pun-
ished by stoning, hanging, floggings and amputation of limbs.'
29
Additionally, the Taliban edicts enforced strict dress codes, prohib-
ited women from working outside the home or attending school, all
to ensure complete dependence of women.' 30 In one circumstance,
a woman was beaten with a car antenna because her face covering
slipped while struggling to carry her two small children and
groceries.131
Third, once these women who face gender-related persecution
reach the courts, they face further impediments. 132 First, the sub-
stantive law applied in evaluating whether an individual is eligible
for refugee status is generally narrowly construed.' 33 The substan-
his wife for adultery in Columbia. Wife killings in Brazil were considered to be non-
criminal "honor killings" until 1991.
126. Lindsay A. Franke, Note Meeting the Standard: U.S. Asylum Law & Gender-Related
Claims, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 605, 612 (2000). U.S. asylum law lacks a consistent
willingness to recognize that persecution suffered by many women seeking asylum is
persecution inflicted precisely on the basis of their gender.
127. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Taking Cover:
Women in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/wrd/afghan-
women-2k2.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003). Even after the toppling of the Taliban in
November 2001, Afghan women continue to face serious threats to their physical safety,
which denies them the opportunity to exercise their basic human rights. The lack of
security in Afghanistan has affected women in gender-specific ways, making them espe-
cially vulnerable to rape and other sexual abuse. The danger of physical assault is evi-
dent. Young females live under constant fear of physical assault and are compelled to
limit their movement, expression and dress to avoid becoming targets of such violence.
Id.
128. Tim McGirk & Shomali Plain, Lifting the Veil on Sex Slavery, TIME, Feb. 18 2002,
at 8.
129. Gray, supra note 104, at 559-60.
130. Id. at 559.
131. US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, US De-
partment of State March 1998 Report on Women and Girls in Afghanistan (1998).
132. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Consti-
tutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2403 (2002).
133. PAMELA GOLDBERG, WHERE IN THE WORLD IS THERE SAFETY FOR ME?: WOMEN
FLEEING GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION, IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNA-
TIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 345, 346 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper, eds., Routledge,
Chapman and Hall) (1995).
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tive problems facing women seeking asylum arise from the failure
of decision makers to incorporate the gender-related claims into
their interpretation of the established five enumerated catego-
ries.134 Second, it is usually male adjudicators who evaluate asylum
applicants and often dismiss gender-related persecution as private
and personal. 13 5 Failure to recognize a gender-related claim can be
attributed to a society that privileges the male-dominated public
sphere over the activities of a woman, which take place largely in
the private sector. 13 6 Because it is mostly male adjudicators who
evaluate asylum claims, asylum law is centered on the male appli-
cant, the male situation, and the male experience. 13 7 Naturally, the
result is one of a male-dominated evaluation that results in a denial
of a claim that is dismissed as private, instead of being recognized as
the socially significant phenomenon that it is.138
Last, women should not be obligated to seek asylum under the
same conditions as men because, generally, courts use different
standards for female and male applicants. 13 9 In Klawitter v. INS, the
Sixth Circuit denied political asylum to a Polish woman who had
been blacklisted for her refusal to join the Communist Party, and in
turn was sexually assaulted by the Chief of Security in the Polish
government. 140 The court found that the officer's actions were
committed because the official had a "personal" interest in the
claimant, rather than "any interest on his part to 'persecute' her."
The threats against her were not found to constitute persecution. 141
Nevertheless, men who have differing political opinions from
the establishment in their country of origin are often granted asy-
lum. 1 42 The Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a male refugee from
Haiti because he feared persecution based on his failure to pay
134. See supra note 38.
135. Id. Decision makers in both U.S. Courts and International Courts have failed
to recognize the political nature of seemingly "private" acts of harm to women.
136. Daliah Setareh, Women Escaping Genital Mutilation-Seeking Asylum in the United
States, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 134 (1995).
137. Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 636 (1993).
138. See supra note 38.
139. Kandt, supra note 121, at 149.
140. Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).
141. Id. at 152.
142. Kandt, supra 121, at 150.
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bribes to the Haitian government. 143 Petitioner claimed he was in a
small group that privately spoke out against the government. 144 The
Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions that resistance to
official government extortion may constitute expression of political
opinion.' 45 While this resistance to extortion would appear to be a
reasonable classification of persecution, the courts held that sexual
abuse did not.146 "It is ironic that American courts recognize asylum
for men who belong to underground groups, yet fail to do the same
for a woman who was openly blacklisted and sexually assaulted.'
'1 47
This dichotomy represents the schism in the private / public sphere
where sexual offenses are not seen as persecution, but where male
activists that cause punishment are seen as such.' 48 Thus, given the
different standards of persecution applied to refugee claims de-
pending on the gender of the applicant, the United States needs to
alleviate the inherent sexism presently embedded in the law.'
49
Despite the apparent need to transform current asylum law,
the claims of women asylum seekers continue to meet denials due
to erroneous interpretations of the standards applicable to refu-
gees.1 50 There is also a significant lack of understanding of the ap-
plicable human rights norms and the relevant country
conditions.'51
In Gomez v. INS,a52 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that persecution based on gender alone does not constitute
persecution on account of a particular social group.153 In Matter of
143. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 724.
145. Id. at 730.
146. Kandt, supra note 121, at 150. The applicant's case in Desir was remanded,
while the applicant's case in Klawitter was denied outright.
147. Id. at 151.
148. Id. at 151 (citing Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus
Cogens, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 69 (1993)).
149. Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender ofJus Cogens, 15 HuM.
RTS. Q. 69 (1993).
150. Long, supra note 1, at 202. The absence of any structure with which to evaluate
gender-related claims has crippled decision making in some cases, resulting either in
distortion of the established categories or denial of claims due to misapplication of the
element of gender.
151. See supra note 106. In Fisher v. INS the court refused to consider US Depart-
ment of State Country Reports on the conditions of gender abuse.
152. Gomez, 947 F.2d 660.
153. Id. at 660.
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Fauziya Kasinga 54 the court decided that the practice of female
genital mutilation (FGM) could justify a grant of asylum.155 The
court's decision seemed to open up the way for an asylum category
based on gender.1 56 However, any expansion was terminated when
the appellate court overruled the immigration judge's decision. 157
Since the Kasinga'5 8 decision, the BIA has granted asylum to only
one woman based on the fear of FGM in the case of Abankwah v.
INS, decided in July 1999.159 Despite the fact that the BIA ruled that
gender is included in the meaning of social group, inconsistent im-
migration court rulings in recent cases of sex and gender-related
persecution demonstrate that women seeking asylum based on
these grounds fight a new battle with each case.1 60
In 1999, the BIA published the decision of Matter of S-A-.' 6 1 In
that case, the court granted asylum to a Moroccan woman who suf-
fered physical and emotional abuse by her father who beat her be-
cause she did not conform to his idea of a Muslim woman.1 62 The
court stated that although S-A- did not seek police protection, the
evidence convinced the court that even if S-A- had turned to the
government for help, Moroccan authorities would have been una-
ble or unwilling to control her father's conduct. 63 The court con-
cluded that the woman was eligible for asylum. 164 This decision
154. Fauziya Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (1996).
155. Id. at 357.
156. Kathy M. Salamat, In Re Fauziya Kasinga: Expanding the Judicial Interpretation of
"Persecution," "Well-Founded Fear, "and "Social Group" to Include Anyone Feeling "General Civil
Violence?", 40 How. L. J. 255, 256-57 (1996). Although the Fauziya Kasinga opinion does
not overtly advocate either of these alternatives, it formulates a workable precedent for
dealing with gender-based claims. The Fauziya Kasinga decision sheds light on a gender
category in asylum law.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999).
160. An Mai Nguyen, The Torture Convention: A Gap Filler for the Holes in US. Asylum
Policy Towards Victims of Domestic Violence, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 171, 178 (2000). See also
Marian Kennady, Gender-Related Persecution and the Adjudication of Asylum Claims: Is a Sixth
Category Needed?, 12 FLA. J. INT'L L. 317, 320 (1998). Adjudication of gender-based
claims has been inconsistent as courts struggle to "fit" the gender-based claim into one
of the five enumerated grounds for asylum.
161. Matter of S-A-, Int. Dec. 3433 (B.I.A. June 27, 2000).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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took place shortly after the denial of asylum to a woman in Matter of
R-A-. a65
In that case, the BIA reversed an immigration judge's grant of
asylum because the petitioner had failed to show that she was perse-
cuted on account of her membership in a particular social group or
for her political opinion.166 Although the BIA was convinced that
her husband abused her and would abuse her again and that she
was unable to gain protection from Guatemalan authorities, the
court denied her asylum status. 167 The court stated that the severe
injuries sustained rise to the level of harm sufficient enough to con-
stitute persecution. 168 However the court concluded that she was
not eligible for protection under asylum laws, as she failed to fall
under the definition of one of the five enumerated classes.'
69
The previous examples illustrate the problems women face
when trying to seek asylum based on gender-specific abuse. As ap-
parent as some of the persecutions may seem in any given applica-
tion, without a clear definition to guide administrative agencies and
the judiciary, personal prejudices and cultural ethnocentricities will
continue to be the basis for asylum opinions. Reform in asylum law
is needed to ameliorate this pervasive discrepancy and discrimina-
tion.170 Gender persecution should not veil itself behind the classifi-
cation of a "social group. '' ' 71 Rather gender should and can be a
category in its own right.172
As exemplified above, certain courts have begun to recognize
the need for changes to the current standards in the law. There
have been suggestions, perhaps nominal in substance, but yet signif-
icant in nature, that may enable the proposal for a gender-specific
category in asylum law to become an actuality.17 3
165. In re R-A-, 2001 BIA LEXIS 1.
166. Id.
167. Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and Its Implications, 76
No. 30 INTERRELL 1177, 1177 (1999).
168. Id. at 1181.
169. Id. at 1177.
170. Kandt, supra note 121, at 151.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Mattie L. Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender
as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 179 (1993) (proposing that the
U.S. include gender as a refugee category, encompassing female genital mutilation). See
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B. Trends in the Making: Modernizing Asylum Law
Reform efforts in international and national asylum laws recog-
nize a greater need for a clear definition of persecution and an
exclusive category for those who face gender-related crimes. 174
Scholars in the United States and abroad have been calling for the
addition of gender as one of the criteria under which an asylum
seeker may claim persecution. 175
1. Trends in U.S. Asylum Law
In 1993 the Third Circuit expanded the type of conduct that
constitutes "persecution."1 76 The court determined that the con-
cept of persecution may be interpreted broadly to include govern-
mental measures that compel an individual to participate in
conduct that is not physically painful or harmful but is contrary to
that person's deepest beliefs. 1 77
The court held that Iranian women might constitute a particu-
lar class when they find their country's gender specific laws offen-
sive and do not wish to comply. 178 The court found that the
definition of a particular social group was open-ended because
there was no specific definition within the legislative history.179 The
court applied the test from Matter of Acosta to define a social group
as one with a common characteristic that "members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because
it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. '18 0
Despite the court's liberal approach to asylum law, the appli-
cant was denied asylum because the court did not believe that a
also Schenk, supra note 2, at 338-341; Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need
for Refugee Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 221, 221 (2000); Shannon Nichols,
American Mutilation: The Effects of Gender-Biased Asylum Laws on the World's Women, 6 FALL
KANJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 42, 45 (1997).
174. Marquez v. I.N.S., 105 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify the requirements for asylum and deportation withholding. The court
held that there must exist a "clear probability" of fear, making the standard stricter than
the established "well-founded fear" required for asylum.
175. Schenk, supra note 2, at 337-338.
176. Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
177. Id. at 1242.
178. Id. at 1239.
179. Id.
180. Matter of Acosta, 1985 B.I.A. Lexis 2, 55 (1985).
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woman, who was prevented from living in accordance with her ide-
ologies, and forced (by fear of physical punishment) to conform to
the social norm, constitutes persecution.' 8l
Although the court found that the applicant did not risk "per-
secution" because she had not shown that she would disobey the
rules or that to disobey the rules would be so "profoundly abhor-
rent" as to amount to persecution, the court found that the punish-
ments, if implemented, would rise to the level of persecution. 82
2. Trends in International Asylum Law
Other nations have participated in the growing concern for
providing adequate protection for women who suffer persecution
based on their gender.18 3 International law has supported the spe-
cial treatment of women facing gender-related persecution and
gender-based discrimination. 184 U.S. asylum law can now be mea-
sured against international standards.
The United Nations has passed several binding and non-bind-
ing resolutions concerning women and refugees, such as the
United Nations Declaration for Elimination of Violence Against
Women in December 1993.185 Article 1 of the Declaration defines
violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence that
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering of women.. . whether occurring in public or pri-
vate life."'186 Article 2 gives examples of violence against women as
physical, sexual and psychological violence and abuse occurring in
the family, in the general community, or perpetrated and con-
181. Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233 at 1241. The applicant feared being jailed, punished in
public, whipped, or stoned if she refused to comply with the strict Iranian rules. The
applicant asserted that the routine penalty for women who break the moral code in
Iran is "74 lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes and deaths."
182. Id. at 1241.
183. Amnesty International, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Uune 13, 2002).
184. Goldberg, supra note 133.
185. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., at 1039, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104
(1994).
186. Id. at art. 1.
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ducted by the State.1 8 7 Although not binding, the Declaration may
serve as an important guideline to U.S. immigration law.
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW) is binding and declares that all sig-
natories to the Convention shall "modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct... which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotype roles for
men and women. '"1 8 8
Dealing specifically with refugees, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees issued Guidelines for the Protection of
Refugee Women. 8 9 The Guidelines recognize the special need for
protection of women to adequate social and economic rights, ac-
cess to basic items such as "food, shelter, clothing and medical care,
[and] security against armed attacks and other forms of
violence."190
In December of 1984, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) requiring that
no state shall "expel, return or extradite [any] person to another
state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."'' CAT extends
187. Id. at art. 2.
188. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th plen. mtg., Annex, pt. 1, art.5, at
193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1981). The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the only comprehensive international
treaty guaranteeing women's human rights. CEDAW provides a universal international
standard for women's human rights and a framework for governmental policy to com-
bat gender inequality. Although the U.S. signed the treaty in 1980, the U.S. Senate
never ratified it. On July 30, 2002 in a 12-7 vote, the Senate committee sent CEDAW to
the full Senate. Senate approval requires a two-thirds vote, or 67 senators. All 10 of the
committee's Democrats voted to approve the treaty, as did two republicans. In the
meantime, 170 other countries have ratified CEDAW.
189. Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women: Legal Procedures and Crite-
ria for the Determination of Refugee Status, UN Doc. ES/SCP/67 P 57 (1991).
190. Id.
191. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Annex, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
yet another avenue of relief for those applicants who do not meet
the criteria of state asylum.19 2
At the Standing Committee's 16th meeting, the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) discussed the
plight of refugee women and encouraged countries to "recognize
gender-based persecution as a ground for claiming asylum, and to
ensure that asylum procedures are sufficiently gender sensitive."'193
In 1999 the UNHCR offered a legal opinion before the United
Kingdom's House of Lords stating that women who believe in or
are perceived to believe in "standards at odds with the social mores
of the society in which they live constitute a particular social
group."194
The UNHCR has since passed several resolutions dealing with
gender-related persecution. At the UN World Women's Conference
in Beijing in 1995 it was urged that states recognize women as refu-
gees when they have been exposed to gender-related persecution.
With the adoption of CEDAW there has been discussion regarding
the idea of membership in a particular social group and political
opinion as possible bases for refugee recognition for women who
defy gender-based social norms. 195 The Convention seeks to elimi-
nate gender discrimination by having signatory states assure that
women have status equal to men in political representation, educa-
tion, health care, and family life.196 A systematic denial of equal
protection affecting women's standing in courts of law serves as im-
portant evidence that the harm or suffering the claimant faces
arises not out of a personal dispute, but out of an implicit policy of
discrimination in which the "agent" of persecution is seeking to en-
192. Arthur C. Helton, Criteria and Procedures for Refugee Protection in the United States,
Practicing Law Institute Order No. B0-01GH, 245-255 (October - November 2002). An
application for asylum and withholding of removal is also deemed an application for
relief under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, which may be
available for those who fear torture upon return to their country of origin, but who do
not qualify for asylum and withholding of removal.
193. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Standing
Comm. 16th Meeting EC/49/SC/CRP.22 (1999).
194. Id.
195. See supra note 188.
196. Nora O'Connell & Ritu Sharma, Treaty for the Rights of Women Deserves Full U.S.
Support, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, August 29, 2002. Nations such as Turkey, Tanzania,
and Columbia have used CEDAW to improve the quality of women's lives such as pro-
viding legal recourse to female victims of domestic violence.
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force gender-based norms toward women as a group. Therefore the
political opinion category could move away from its usual use to
accommodate "elements of the claimant's persona that cause her to
clash with powerful social and cultural elements." 197
Furthermore, the European Parliament has called on its states
to grant refugee status "to women who suffer cruel and inhuman
treatment because they have violated the moral or ethical rules of
their society."'198
Additionally, the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Ms.
Radhika Coomaraswamy, was mandated to study violence against
women. 199 Ms. Coomaraswamy has suggested that governments
should broaden the definition of a refugee to recognize gender-
based claims of persecution, and that these governments should de-
velop guidelines for gender-specific claims.200 The suggestion goes
even further by recognizing that those persecutions suffered by
men and women may differ,20 1 thus warranting an even greater
need for a gender-specific category.
V. DEVELOPING A GENDER CATEGORY IN U.S. ASYLUM LAw
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de-
cision in Yadegar-Sargis should be overruled. The United States
must begin to take responsibility for those women who have a well-
founded fear of persecution and cannot be properly categorized
within one of the five enumerated classes of a refugee. 202 These
enumerated categories provide inadequate protection because the
abuses that these women encounter are not on account of their
race, nationality, religion, membership in a social group, or politi-
197. Refugee Women's Resource Project Asylum Aid, WOMEN'S ASYLUM NEWS, Issue 14
Sept. 2001, at 5.
198. Karin Landgren, Gender-Related Persecution, WOMEN'S AND ASYLUM, Sept. 4,
1997.
199. The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), E/CN.4/
1997/47 (1997).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States,
Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J.
25, 48 (1998).
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cal opinion.20 3 Rather, these women suffer abuses solely on the ba-
sis of their gender.20 4 The United States should amend the current
standards of asylum law to afford these women broader
protection.2 05
The United States should amend its current asylum laws in or-
der to formally recognize a category for gender specific crimes. 20 6
The only way to remedy the oppressive conditions caused by cur-
rent asylum laws is either to add a sixth "gender" category for gen-
der-specific crimes or to transform the law altogether to better
address crimes against women. 20 7 In addition to existing definitions
and standards, an amended version of current refugee law should
add gender as a new category.208
A refugee applying for asylum on the basis of gender would
have to fulfill all requirements of the asylum laws. 209 An applicant
would have to prove that the harm she faces rises to the level of
persecution "encompass [ing] more than threats to life or free-
dom."2 10 Additionally, an applicant would have to prove that the
persecution she faces is one that is well-founded, by fulfilling both
the subjective and objective components. 211
When amending U.S. asylum law, the United States should go
further than simply amending established definitions of a refugee.
To ensure the protection of women who face gender specific abuses
the U.S. should implement new methods of interpretation and
analysis in determining the asylum status of women, such as using
gender sensitive techniques to analyze an applicant's claim. Be-
cause the abuses these women face are unique and specific to their
203. Gray, supra note 104, at 573, see also NICHOLS, supra note 173. Without a clear
"gender" category or a complete transformation of the law, women fleeing their coun-
tries due to gender-specific crimes have no protection.
204. Id. at 574.
205. Schenk, supra note 2, at 337.
206. Gray, supra note 104, at 572.
207. Nichols, supra note 173.
208. This amendment simply adds the gender category to the already existing defi-
nition of a refugee.
209. Gray, supra note 104, at 572.
210. Guevara-Flores, 786 F.2d 1242.
211. Gray, supra note 104, at 572. American, Australian and Canadian directives
address state responsibility for persecutory acts committed by non-state actors. All pro-
ceed from the basic premise that the state owes a duty to protect citizens' basic rights,
not only from abrogation by the state itself but from private actors as well.
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gender, their application process for asylum status should also be
unique and specific.
A. Gender Sensitive Techniques
In addition to amending the definition of a refugee, the
United States should enhance the availability of a gender category
by providing female interpreters and interviewers to those women
who face persecution based on their gender.212 Many of the current
interpreters and reviewers of asylum claims are men who do not
comprehend the grave consequences women suffer from gender
specific crimes. 213 Reluctance on the part of women to discuss their
experiences is often due to the presence of a male official or inter-
preter.214 For example, when the applicant is a woman from a soci-
ety where "the preservation of one's virginity or marital dignity is
the cultural norm," this norm may cause her to be reluctant to dis-
cuss her experiences of sexual violence. 215 She may believe to do so
would be to openly admit her "shame" and to dishonor her
family.2 16
By providing a number of gender-sensitive techniques to inter-
view asylum applicants, women will begin to describe their fears and
past experiences of persecution. At certain points, it may be neces-
sary to provide these women with counselors or cultural experts in
order to fully comprehend their grounds for asylum and the seri-
ousness of their claims. 217
The interview process should instill confidence within the ap-
plicant so that all information gathered is truthful and depicted to
the fullest potential. The interviewer and interpreter should be well
212. See supra note 122.
213. Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique of the 1995
INS Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 276-277 (1997). Poor interview tech-
niques, cross-cultural skills and an ignorance of issues specifically related to gender-
based asylum claims, may produce faulty negative credibility findings which can ulti-
mately result in sending women straight back to the hands of their prosecutors.
214. Nahla Valji & Lee Anne De La Hunt, Gender Guidelines for Asylum Determination,
NAT'L CONSORTIUM ON REFUGEE AFAS (1999). In many cultures, rape and sexual as-
sault are still perceived as failure by a woman to protect her body and sexual integrity.
Women face shame and anxiety about the loss of virginity, even in cases of rape and
may cause a woman's unwillingness to discuss the matter.
215. Pell, supra note 5 at 669.
216. Id.
217. Valji & De La Hunt, supra note 214, at 10.
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trained in the area of gender-sensitivity and should also have a good
understanding of the fear of these women. All officials should be
made aware of cultural and gender differences that exist between
male and female applicants within both, the application and com-
munication processes. 218
B. International Solutions: Canadian Guidelines
In 1993, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board issued
Guidelines ("Canadian Guidelines") on Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecutions.219 The Canadian Guidelines
are perhaps one of the most remarkable achievements in Canadian
legal history in this century. 220 "By including gender-related perse-
cution within the refugee definition, Canada has broken down
[the] discriminatory hierarchies of persecution." 22 The Canadian
Guidelines can provide assistance to U.S. decision makers in inter-
preting the definition of a refugee and adjudicating asylum claims
based on gender specific persecutions. 222
The Canadian Guidelines have recognized "gender-based vio-
lence as a legitimate form of persecution for the purpose of grant-
ing refugee status." 223 The Canadian Guidelines have interpreted
the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee to include gender-re-
lated issues and approach gender-related claims more sensitively. 224
The Canadian Guidelines recognize that, although gender is
not specifically enumerated as one of the grounds established in
the 1951 Convention, "the 1951 Convention can be interpreted to
provide protection to women making gender-based claims on any
one or a combination of the five enumerated grounds." 225 When
such a claim is presented, the central issue is to determine the
218. See id., at 12.
219. Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Guidelines Issued by the
Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act (Immigration and Refugee
Board, Ottawa, Canada), Nov. 13, 1996, [hereinafter Canadian Guidelines].
220. Sherene Razack, Domestic Violence as Gender Persecution: Policing the Borders of Na-
tion, Race, and Gender, 8 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 45, 47 (1995).
221. Pell, supra note 5, at 684.
222. Macklin, supra note 202, at 26.
223. Pell, supra note 5, at 658.
224. Nurjehan Mawani, Violations of the Rights of Women in the Refugee Context, 5
N.J.C.L. 61, 66 (1995).
225. Pell, supra note 5, at 665.
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"linkage between gender, the feared persecution, and one or more
of the [five] definition grounds." 22 16
First, the decision maker must identify the nature of the perse-
cution feared by the claimant. Recognizing that women can suffer
different forms of persecution from men, the Canadian Guidelines
identify four broad, nonexclusive categories of persecution that
women encounter.
A woman can fear persecution under "the same 1951 Conven-
tion grounds, and in similar circumstances, as men."227 Second,
women can fear persecution because of kinship. 228 In addition,
women can fear persecution resulting from "circumstances of se-
vere discrimination on the grounds of gender," or resulting from
violent acts by public authorities or private citizens against which
the state is either unwilling or unable to offer protection. 229 Finally,
women can fear persecution "as a consequence for failing to con-
form to, or for transgressing, religious or customary laws and prac-
tices in their country of origin." 230
"Once the nature of the persecution that a claimant faces has
been identified, the decision maker will then determine if the basis
of the persecution falls within one of the five enumerated 1951
Convention grounds." 231 First, the Canadian Guidelines reveal that
women refugees may fear persecution both because of their race
and gender.23 2 The Canadian Guidelines use the example of an
Asian woman living in Tanzania. 233 Two men who claimed that they
worked for the Department of Home Affairs sexually and physically
abused the applicant at her workplace. 234 When "the applicant re-
ported the incident to her father, she was told to remain quiet be-
cause of [her] Muslim customs." 235 Despite the fact that the two
men continued to harass her, she did not report the abuse because
226. CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 219.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Pell, supra note 5, at 665.
232. CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 219.
233. Pell, supra note 5 at 682 (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 1,
4 (Oct. 18 1993)).
234. Id. (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 2 (Oct. 18 1993)).
235. Id.
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she was "convinced that the Tanzanian government turns a blind
eye to the physical abuse of women." 23 6 After continued abuse, the
applicant fled to Canada claiming a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion for three reasons: on the basis of her race, Asian; on the basis
of her religion, Muslim; and on the basis of her gender, female."
237
Although sympathizing with the applicant, the Immigration and
Refuge Board (IRB) panel held that it was unlikely that the appli-
cant would face persecution on account of her gender.238 The
court held that "the applicant did not establish that her persecution
was the result of either her racial background or her gender."239
This case clearly illustrates that a woman who suffers persecution
does not automatically receive refugee status. Rather, "she must
show that her claim is based upon a 1951 Convention ground, and
[that her] country of origin is unwilling or unable to protect
her."
2 4 0
Similarly, the Canadian Guidelines recognize that a woman
may experience gender-related persecution based on her choice
not to hold a particular religious belief.24 1 According to the Cana-
dian Guidelines, "the notion of religion may encompass [both] the
freedom to hold a belief system of one's choice or not to hold a
particular belief system [as well as] the freedom to practice a relig-
ion of one's [own] choice or not to practice a prescribed system." 2 42
The Canadians Guidelines provide as an example, a woman living
in an Islamic society who refuses to subscribe to the precepts of the
established state religion. 243 Because "her father decided that she
was too 'westernized' he imposed a Muslim way of life upon her."
244
The woman "was unable to leave the house alone, her phone calls
were censored and her books were taken away from her."2 45 In ad-
236. Id. (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 3 (Oct. 18 1993)).
237. Id. (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 4 (Oct. 18 1993)).
238. Pell, supra note 5, at 682 (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheesernan, at 6
(Oct. 18 1993)).
239. Id. (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 7 (Oct. 18 1993)).
240. Id. (citing CRDD T93 - 05072, Howson, Cheeseman, at 10 (Oct. 18 1993)).
241. CANADA GUIDELINES, supra note 219.
242. Id.
243. Pell, supra note 5, at 679 (citing CRDD M92- 06719, de Liarnchin, Vo, at 1-2
(May 11, 1993)).
244. Id. (citing CRDD M92- 06719, de Liarnchin, Vo, at 2-3 (May 11, 1993)).
245. Id.
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dition, she was forced to marry an older man, in which her pres-
ence at the marriage ceremony was not even required. 246 She later
left her native country of Algeria in fear that, if she returned, her
father would kill her for not following the Islamic way of life. 247 The
woman testified that because she came from a prominent and well-
known family in Algeria, "she could not have obtained police pro-
tection anywhere in the country."248 Thus, the IRB panel granted
her asylum on the basis that her father's physical and emotional
force was a violation of the applicant's security, which amounted to
"cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. '249
In addition, the Canadian Guidelines recognize that a woman
may experience gender-related persecution based on her political
opinion and membership in a particular social group. When re-
turning from a meeting of a student political group, a Pakistani fe-
male student was attacked, beaten and raped by a member of a rival
student political group. 250 Because of strict social mores concerning
rape law in Pakistan, the applicant did not report the rape. 251 She
feared that if her family knew about the rape, she would be killed in
order to protect the family honor.252 As a result of the rape, the
applicant became pregnant and could not receive an abortion. 253
She explained that under Pakistan law and the law of the Koran,
abortions are illegal, and persons who have relations outside of
marriage could face a death sentence.25 4 When pleading for asy-
lum, she claimed refugee status based on political opinion and her
membership in a particular social group - a single, raped Pakistani
female with a child born out of wedlock.255 The IRB panel granted
her asylum because she was able to distinguish herself as a member
of a particular social group. The IRB found that the Pakistani crimi-
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Pell, supra note 5, at 679 (citing CRDD M92- 06719, de Liarnchin, Vo, at 4
(May 11, 1993)).
249. Id.
250. Pell, supra note 5, at 671 (citing CRDD U93 - 06372, Fraser, Silcoff, at 1 (Oct.
1, 1993)).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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nal justice system had created an extremely adverse and precarious
situation for women, and in particular for women victims of rape. 256
Citing the Canadian Guidelines, the IRB panel found that the ap-
plicant was a member of a particular social group on the basis of
her gender.257
Since the creation of the Canadian Guidelines, there has been
no increase in either the number of women making asylum claims
or the number of asylum claims granted to women.258 The Cana-
dian Guidelines control any increase in the number of applicants
through procedural and substantive requirements that would pre-
vent judiciaries from granting asylum to vast populations of women
suffering from similar abuses.259 By assessing the applicant's credi-
bility, determining the possibility of state protection and separating
gender-related fears of persecution from mere dislike of a country's
law or policy, the Canadian Guidelines ensure that those asylum
claims based on gender are appropriate and accurate. 260
Many women who have been denied asylum in the United
States would most likely have been granted asylum in Canada under
the new guidelines. 261 By refusing to recognize gender as a cate-
gory, the United States continues to deny refugee status to those
females who truly deserve protection. 262 The United States should
use the Canadian Guidelines as a model for a first step in formulat-
ing its own domestic policy on asylum law.26 3 If these, or similar
guidelines, are adopted by the United States, women like Ms. Sargis
will finally gain equal access to eligibility for asylum in the United
States. 264
C. Dismissing the Arguments Against Adding a Gender Category
The principal argument made against the addition of a gender
category in asylum law is based on the fear that such inclusion
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Pell, supra note 5, at 658.
259. Id. at 684.
260. Id. at 670.
261. Kandt, supra note 121, at 163.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Pell, supra note 5, at 684.
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would overwhelm nations with applicants claiming persecution
based upon gender. However, it has been argued that this fear has
no foundation. 265 Governments are concerned that an addition of a
gender category is too large and ambiguous. Nations fear that by
adding a gender category millions of women will seek asylum on
the basis of violence against them. The most important concern is
that there will exist no apparent standard to determine whether the
"fear" one claims constitutes a legitimate "well founded fear" of a
gender specific persecution, thus opening the floodgates to asylum
law.
2 6 6
Despite these concerns, it is well recognized that the floodgate
argument is not a relevant one.2 67 Women seeking refugee status
still must conquer numerous procedural and substantive require-
ments, and thus, nations may prevent holdings that would allow
large populations of women suffering a particular abuse to seek asy-
lum. 2 68 Thus, a woman who has suffered spousal abuse must show
that no state protection exists to stop the abuse. 269 A woman who
was forced into marriage by her father must show that the political
power of her father made it impossible for her to receive police
protection. 270 And a woman who fears persecution because of her
identification with a political group must prove her credibility by
showing that she knew of the particular beliefs of this political
group, and she must explain why she did not seek refugee status in
any other country.271
265. See Patricia A. Seith, Book Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of
Protection for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. Rav. 1804, 1838 (1997). Not only is the fear
of floodgates unfounded, but it is also highly unlikely. The floodgates argument is un-
founded in the view of the fact that Canada and France have recognized female genital
mutilation as a basis for refugee status and neither country has had an influx of women
seeking refugee status. See also, Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Muti-
lation as Ground for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In Re Fauziya Kasinga
and Prospects for more Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 375, 387
(1997).
266. Seith, supra note 265.
267. Nichols, supra note 173.
268. Pell, supra note 5, at 683.
269. Id. at 683-84.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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Thus, the floodgate argument is not a legitimate one when
concerning human rights and refugee law.2 72 When applying a bal-
ancing test (if permitted to do so on a human life) in face of the
floodgate argument, it is apparent that it is clearly more crucial to
save the life of one human being, of one woman persecuted be-
cause of her gender, than it is to fear that a second may apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Yadegar-Sargis fails to provide adequate protec-
tion for women who face persecutions based specifically on their
gender.273 According to Yadegar-Sargis, women may continue to
face gender specific persecutions without being provided any
means of defense. By using the current categories of asylum law the
court is unable to provide the applicant with adequate protection.
The holding in Yadegar-Sargis effectively allows persecutors to
continue burning, beating, and raping women because of the fact
that they are women. Thus, the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Yadegar-Sargis v. INS must be
overruled.
In addition, the United States should amend its asylum law to
include gender within the refugee definition.274 Because of the lack
of a gender category, advocates representing the immediate inter-
ests of persecuted women have had no other option but to frame
their asylum cases within one of the current categories.275 Until a
fundamental change is made to the asylum framework, inconsisten-
cies in U.S. asylum law will likely continue.276 We must begin to
send a definitive message to asylum adjudicators that they must
treat gender-based persecution as they do other forms of persecu-
tion.277 Gender-related asylum claims should be subject to the same
legal standards and burdens of proof as any other asylum claim.
278
272. Minister of Employment and Immigration, New Refugee Status Advisory Guide-
lines on Refugee Definition and Assessment of Credibility (1982).
273. See supra note 106. The court failed to make any express reference to guide-
lines on gender.
274. Kandt, supra note 121, at 143.
275. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON HALL L. REv.
207, 249 (2002).
276. Id. at 255.
277. Id.
278. Anker et al., surpa note 12, at 745.
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By adopting guidelines similar to those of Canada, the United
States can begin to assist women, persecuted based on their gender,
such as Ms. Sargis, to gain equal access to eligibility for asylum in
the United States.279 The addition of a sixth category to current
asylum law is necessary to eliminate the gender bias that exists in
asylum law and provide heightened, long-term protection for the
human rights of women. 280
279. Pell, supra note 5, at 684.
280. Schenk, supra note 2, at 344.
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